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Contract Law: An Alternative to Tort Law as a
Basis for Wrongful Discharge Actions in Illinois
INTRODUCTION

Employment relationships should reflect current economic and
social relationships among people.1 In Illinois, however, the law
governing employer-employee relations has not kept pace with
changes in economic and social conditions. An employment relationship in Illinois which is not controlled by a collective bargaining agreement or an individual contract specifying a definite duration is considered terminable at will.' A terminable at will
employment contract permits either the employer or the employee
to end their relationship arbitrarily.' Under this type of contract,
an employer incurs no liability for discharging an employee, regardless of the employee's job performance, seniority, or loyalty to
the employer.4
The harshness of the terminable at will rule on employees, who
by the nature of the employment relationship occupy a weaker
bargaining position than do their employers, 5 has led courts in
1. 3A A. CORBIN,

CONTRACTS

§ 674 (1960).

2. Buian v. J. L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 1970). See generally cases
cited at note 3 infra.
3. The following are the major Illinois decisions on terminable at will employment contracts: Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Kurle v. Evangelical
Hosp. Ass'n, 89 Ill. App. 3d 45, 411 N.E.2d 326 (2d Dist. 1980); Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp.,
88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d 50 (5th Dist. 1980); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 Ill.
App. 3d 50, 406 N.E.2d 595 (3d Dist. 1980), rev'd, No. 53780 (I1. April, 1981); Sargent v.
Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist. 1979); Criscione v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 384 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1978); Leach v. Lauhoff
Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (4th Dist. 1977); Stevenson v. ITT Harper,
Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d 568, 366 N.E.2d 561 (1st Dist. 1977); Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist. v.
Jones, 51 111.App. 3d 182, 367 N.E.2d 111 (3d Dist. 1977); Long v. Arthur Rubloff & Co., 27
Ill. App. 3d 1013, 327 N.E.2d 346 (1st Dist. 1975); Roemer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 25 Iln. App. 3d
606, 323 N.E.2d 582 (1st Dist. 1975); Schoen v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 197,
243 N.E.2d 31 (3d Dist. 1968); Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d
355 (1st Dist. 1959); Goodman v. Motor Products Corp., 9 InI. App. 2d 57, 132 N.E.2d 356
(2d Dist. -1956).
4. See generally cases cited at note 3 supra.
5. The Illinois Supreme Court has expressly recognized that employees occupy inherently unequal positions. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., No. 53780, slip op. at 2 (II. April,
1981). Other Illinois decisions acknowledge by implication the disparity that exists between
the employer and the employee. Right of control by the employer over the employee, for
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many jurisdictions to question the soundness of allowing employers
unfettered freedom in discharging personnel." This article will pro-

example, is considered cogent evidence of the existence of an employment relationship. Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Jockish, 83 Ill. App. 3d 411, 414, 403 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (3d Dist. 1980). In
addition, the Illinois Supreme Court in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 182, 384
N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978) recognized that employers can abuse their power by threatening to
discharge employees. Lastly, Illinois courts will not honor exculpatory clauses in employment contracts where the employer is released from liability for torts committed against
employees. See, e.g., Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 415 Ill. 453, 460, 114 N.E.2d 721, 725
(1953); Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens BIdgs., 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 17-18, 155 N.E.2d
372, 380 (1st Dist. 1958). Exculpatory clauses, however, are valid when the parties to the
contract possess relatively equal bargaining strength. Rutter v. Arlington Park Jockey Club,
510 F.2d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 1975); Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 614 (7th
Cir. 1975); First Financial Ins. Co. v. Purolator Security, Inc., 69 Ill. App. 3d 413, 418-19,
388 N.E.2d 17, 21 (1st Dist. 1979). That employers are precluded from exculpating themselves from liability to employees indicates, therefore, that Illinois courts do not consider
employers and employees to possess equal bargaining power. See also, Blades, Employment
at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 1404, 1406, 1425 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blades]; Comment, Employment at
Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALo L. REV. 211, 241 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Employment at Will]; Comment, ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HAnv. L. REv. 1816, 1828-29
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Protecting at Will Employees]; Comment, Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc. - A Remedy for the Abusively DischargedAt Will Employee, 1979 S. ILL. U.
L. J. 563, 585 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Remedy for the Abusively
Discharged].
6. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Michigan law); McKinney v. Nat'l Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980);
McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Savodnik v.
Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp.
1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979); Larsen v. Motor
Supply Co., 117 Ariz. App. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27
Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn,
Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961); Petermann v. Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc.,
179 Conn 471, 427 A.2d 385, (1980); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563
P.2d 54 (1977); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973);
Scott v. Union Tank Car Co., 402 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. App. 1980); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight
Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky.
App. 1977); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Rowe v. Noren
Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979); Trombetta v. Detroit,
Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978); Sventko v. Kroger Co.,
69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980);
Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (1980); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160
N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978); Campbell v. Ford Indus. Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d
141 (1976); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Geary v. United States Steel
Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super.
Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764
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vide a survey of the judicial development in Illinois of a cause of
action in tort for the wrongfully discharged employee. Contract law
will then be proposed as an alternative to tort law as a basis for a
wrongful discharge action in Illinois.
HISTORY

The terminable at will rule was an outgrowth of the late nineteenth century belief in freedom to contract and laissez-faire policies, 7 as well as a response to the labor shortages accompanying
industrial growth during that period. 8 Courts adopted the terminable at will rule to safeguard entrepreneurs.9
Terminable at will contracts were classified by courts as unilateral. 10 The employer's offer of compensation for services was accepted by the employee's performance of the acts specified in the
offer." When an employer discharged an employee, courts viewed
the termination not as a breach of contract, but as a withdrawal of
the employment offer.12 Because employers were not bound to retain an employee for any definite period, employer control over
personnel was maximized.1"
Economic and social conditions in the United States have
changed dramatically since the terminable at will rule was
adopted. 4 The emergence in the twentieth century of large, impersonal corporations has reduced the number of persons self-employed, thereby increasing the proportion of employees to employ-

(1977); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (1980).
7. Note, Tort Remedy for Retaliatory Discharge:Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act
Limits Employer's Power to Discharge Employees Terminable-at-Will - Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 29 DEPAUL L. REv. 561, 563 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tort Remedy]; Comment, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.: Tort Action for Retaliatory Discharge upon Filing Workmen's Compensation Claims, 12 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PRoc. 659, 660 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Tort Action]; Comment, A Remedy for the Abusively Discharged, supra note 5, at 564; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L.
Rv. 335, 343 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Implied Contract Rights] (noting that freedom of enterprise is more appropriate terminology than freedom to contract since courts
expressed no concern for the employee's freedom to contract. Freedom of enterprise pertains to the fundamental right of the employer to discharge as he or she pleases).
8. Comment, Tort Action, supra note 7, at 664.
9. Id.
10. Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1818; Comment, Tort
Action, supra note 7, at 664.
11. See note 10 supra.
12. See note 10 supra.
13. Comment, Tort Action, supra note 7, at 664.
14. See notes 15 - 24 infra and accompanying text.
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ers. 15 The widening employee-employer ratio has had the effect of
both diminishing the bargaining power of employees and minimizing employer recognition of the needs of individual workers."
As employment conditions have changed, so too have the con-

cerns and expectations of employees."1 In particular, job security
has become far more important to modern employees than it was
to their nineteenth century counterparts."8 Labor organizations
have been formed to soften the effect on employees of these chang-

ing conditions. 1' In addition, statutes have been enacted to protect
employees from the heightened control that employers possess
over personnel.' 0 Despite this protection of employees by unions
and legislatures, the terminable at will rule is still generally applied by courts in situations not governed by statutes,' collective
bargaining agreements,"2 or individual contracts that include definite duration terms.'" Many Americans are thereby left without

job security."
JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF THE TERMINABLE AT WILL RULE

Although the terminable at will rule does have harmful consequences, it also has important advantages. Most notably, the rule
leaves employers with the discretion necessary for the exercise of

15. Blades, supra note 5, at 1416.
16. Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 7, at 337-38.
17. Blades, supra note 5, at 1416.
18. Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 7, at 338-39.
19. Id.
20. Blades, supra note 5, at 1410;, Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note
5, at 1827.
21. Comment, ProtectingAt Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1827 (construing NorrisLaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976); National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976); Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §
4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42, U.S.C.);
Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C.)).
22. Blades, supra note 5, at 1405, 1410 (claiming that less than one quarter of the American working population is covered by collective bargaining agreements); Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1816.
23. See generally notes 2 & 6 supra.
24. Comment, ProtectingAt Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1816 (citing U.S. Bureau
of the Census, Dep't. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1979, at 427
(table 704); Id. at 392 (table 644); Id. at 313 (table 509)).
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sound business judgment.2 5 The ability of an employer to control
his or her workforce is essential if the employer is to respond effectively to the changes and uncertainties of the business world.2 6
Control over personnel is also basic to the employer-employee rela27
tionship, which is defined largely by the employer's dominance.
These advantages led courts which questioned the overall soundness of the rule to merely temper, not destroy, the employer's
power to discharge personnel. This modification is consistent with
the recognition by legislatures of the vulnerability of employees,
and demonstrates a beginning awareness in many courts that the
terminable at will rule can produce unacceptably detrimental effects on both workers' 8 and society. 9 In order to strike a proper
balance among the competing concerns of the employer, the employee, and society, courts weigh each interest in a given fact situation before concluding that a wrongful discharge has occurred. 0
The result of using the balancing test has been that the employer's
termination powers have been only slightly modified. 1

25. Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 102, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (1977);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 69, 417 A.2d 505, 510-11 (1980); accord, Abusive Exercise,
supra note 5, at 1428; Mooney & Pingpank, Wrongful Discharge: A "New" Cause of Action?, 54 CONN. B.J. 213, 234 (1980); Comment, Employment At Will, supra note 5, at 237;
Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1835; Note, Implied Contract
Rights, supra note 7, at 336.
26. Comment, Employment At Will, supra note 5, at 237; Comment, ProtectingAt Will
Employees, supra note 5, at 1835.
0
27. See note 5 supra.
28. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Fortune
v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69
Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980);
accord, Comment, Employment At Will, supra note 5, at 211; Comment, ProtectingAt Will
Employees, supra note 5, at 1833-34.
29. See generally cases cited at note 28 supra. See also Glenn v. Clearman's Golden
Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J.
Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978); Campbell v. Ford Indus. Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141
(1976).
30. See, e.g., Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976); Abrisz v.
Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co.,
373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d
549 (1974); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Chin v.
AT&T, 96 Misc.2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
31. See generally cases cited at note 6 supra.
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The Obstacle of Public Policy in Illinois
Wrongful discharge actions 2 in jurisdictions other than Illinois
have been predicated on contract,3 3 tort3 4 and broad public policy
grounds.38 When public policy alone is relied upon to justify limitation of the terminable at will rule, it is often unclear whether the
action sounds in tort or in contract- s Illinois courts have stated
clearly, however, that wrongful discharge is a tort for which puni37
tive damages may be awarded.
The first Illinois cases to recognize a cause of action for wrongful
discharge were Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co."5 and Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.3 e In both cases, terminable at will employees were discharged from their jobs in retaliation for filing Workmen's Compensation claims. 40 Both courts held that the tortious discharges

32. This Note uses the term "wrongful discharge" to encompass claims in all jurisdictions where an employee has brought suit to contest his or her discharge. The claim, however, has been labelled "retaliatory discharge," Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 179,
384 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1978); Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1022-23, 366
N.E.2d 1145-46 (4th Dist. 1977); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d
425, 428 (1973), "abusive discharge," Chin v. AT&T, 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737
(1978), and "wrongful discharge." Hinrichs v. Tranquilare Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1130 (Ala.
1977); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 172, 610 P.2d 1330, 1332, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839, 841 (1980); Jackson v. Mindoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 332, 563 P.2d 54,
57 (1977); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 67, 417 A.2d 505, 509 (1980);
Campbell v. Ford Indus. Inc., 274 Or. 243, 245, 546 P.2d 141, 143 (1976); Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 185, 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974). Because "wrongful discharge"
appears to be the most widely used and flexible term, it has been adopted in this Note.
33. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Petermann v.
Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Fortune
v. Nat'lCash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
(1980).
34. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law); Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
Hinrichs v. Tranquilare Hosp. 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind.
249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976);
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978); Campbell v. Ford Indus.
Inc., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319
A.2d 174 (1974).
36. See generally cases cited at note 35 supra.
37. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 187, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359-60 (1978); Leach v.
Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1023, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1146 (4th Dist. 1977).
38. 51 11. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (4th Dist. 1977).
39. 74 Ii. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
40. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 179, 384 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1978); Leach v.
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contravened the public policy of Illinois as indicated in the Workmen's Compensation Act.41 Because the cases were based on a tortious public policy violation and not on the contractual relationship between the employer and the employee, the courts were free
to bypass the terminable at will rule in order to hold the employers
liable." Both courts, however, stated that their decisions were
merely exceptions to, not abandonments of, the terminable at will
rule. 3
After the Kelsay decision, numerous legal commentators expressed the hope that the tort cause of action for wrongful discharge would be extended by Illinois courts to cover employment
terminations not involving Workmen's Compensation claims." The
judiciary, however, has been reluctant to expand any tort in the
absence of compelling reasons. 4 5 The major obstacle in Illinois to
enlarging the tort of wrongful discharge is the judiciary's approach
to ascertaining what constitutes public policy. Appropriately, the
Illinois Supreme Court has described public policy as the "Achilles
heel" of the tort of retaliatory discharge."
The term "public policy" is considered incapable of precise definition. 7 The definition has been purposely left vague so that the
term might be adapted to a myriad of circumstances.' 8 Rather
than defining public policy, Illinois courts have limited themselves
to identifying the sources of public policy - the Illinois Constitu-

Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1023, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1146 (4th Dist. 1977).
41. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 184, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978); Leach v.
Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1026, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (4th Dist 1977).
42. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 189, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (1978); Leach v.
Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1024, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (4th Dist. 1977).
43. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 189, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (1978); Leach v.
Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1024, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (4th Dist. 1977). For
further analysis of Kelsay and Leach, see generally sources cited at note 44, infra.
44. Fillippi & Popko, Workmen's Compensation: New Cause of Action for Retaliatory
Discharge, 68 ILL. B.J. 329, 332 (1980); Note, Tort Remedy, supra note 7, at 581; Comment,
Tort Action, supra note 7, at 679; Comment, A Remedy for the Abusively Discharged,
supra note 5, at 585.
45. Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 998, 411 N.E.2d 50, 53 (5th Dist.
1980); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 52, 406 N.E.2d 595, 598 (3d Dist.
1980), rev'd, No. 53780 (Ill. April, 1981).
46. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., No. 53780, slip op. at 3 (Ill. April, 1981).
47. Schnackenberg v. Towle, 4 Ill. 2d 561, 565, 123 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1954); Simmons v.
Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldgs., Inc., 20 IMl.App. 2d 1, 11, 155 N.E.2d 372, 377 (1st Dist.
1958). See also Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1024, 366 N.E.2d 1145,
1147 (4th Dist. 1977); Bruno v. Gabhauer, 9 Ill. App. 3d 345, 347, 292 N.E.2d 238, 240 (1st
Dist. 1972).
48. Steel v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927).
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tion, statutes, and, absent guidelines from these sources, judicial
decisions."
Despite the intent to leave the definition of public policy flexible, the courts have construed Illinois law as requiring a strict test
for determining when public policy considerations are present.50
The challenged act must be "pregnant with evil" before it can be
held to have encroached upon public policy. 51
A particularly restrictive approach to public policy is found in
Illinois decisions interpreting exculpatory clauses.5 " In these cases,
Illinois courts have mandated that public policy be settled before
any conduct will be held to violate it.58 Dependence on only settled
public policy, however, destroys any creative decision-making by
the courts. The courts are precluded from formulating new policy
through the use of trends in, or analogies to, Illinois statutes, constitutional clauses or judicial decisions.
Public Policy and Wrongful Discharge
The requirement that public policy be settled is no longer exclusive to cases involving exculpatory clauses. Settled public policy
has also been required in recent cases involving wrongful discharge. A review of the major decisions discussing wrongful discharge claims illustrates both the courts' reluctance to find public
policy violations and the necessary connection in Illinois between
tort and public policy.
Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." was the first case after
Leach55 to consider public policy in relation to the tort of wrongful
49. Schnackenberg v. Towle, 4 IMI.2d 561, 565, 123 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1954); Criscione v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 IM.App. 3d 664, 667-68, 384 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1st Dist. 1978); Leach
v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1024, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (4th Dist. 1977);
Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldgs., Inc., 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 11, 155 N.E.2d 372,
377 (1st Dist. 1958).
50. Rutter v. Arlington Park Jockey Club, 510 F.2d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying
Illinois law).
51. Id., quoting Schnackenberg v. Towle, 4 Ill. 2d 561, 565, 123 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1954).
52. See Rutter v. Arlington Park Jockey Club, 510 F.2d 1065, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 1975);
Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 415 II. 453, 460, 114 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1953); First Financial
Ins. Co. v. Purolator Security, Inc., 69 II. App. 3d 413, 417-18, 388 N.E.2d 17, 20 (1st Dist.
1979).
53. Rutter v. Arlington Park Jockey Club, 510 F.2d 1065, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying Illinois law); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 415 II. 453, 460, 114 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1953);
First Financial Ins. Co. v. Purolator Security, Inc., 69 Ill. App. 3d 413, 417-18, 388 N.E.2d
17, 20 (1st Dist. 1979).
54. 66 m. App. 3d 664, 384 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1978).
55. 51 IM. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (4th Dist. 1977).
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discharge. The plaintiff, who had been a Sears employee for ten
years, alleged that Sears had engaged in a course of conduct
designed to force him to resign, thereby preventing him from receiving unemployment compensation.5 6 The court decided that because Sears's actions did not violate the mandates of the Illinois
Constitution or any statute, no public policy interests had been of-

fended.5 ' No mention was made by the court of judicial decisions
as a source of policy. By ignoring the reasoning applied in Leach,"
Criscione implicitly eliminated judicial decisions as a source to
which the court may look for public policy statements." Further,
the court commented that the legislature's inaction in altering Illinois employment policies precluded the courts from declaring new
policy.6" The absence of public policy contravention allowed the
court to apply the terminable at will rule, which freed Sears from
liability regardless of its reasons for discharging the plaintiff."
Another appellate court case which addressed whether a cause of
action in tort for wrongful discharge would be applicable outside of
the Workmen's Compensation context was Palmateer v. Interna-

56. 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 665-66, 384 N.E.2d 91, 92 (1st Dist. 1978). The plaintiff had been
ill and was restricted to light duty. Shortly thereafter, he was transfered to a highly technical position for which he was given no training. His ensuing inability to perform the new job
resulted in an ultimatum from management that he consent to a demotion or lose his job.
He refused to comply and was discharged.
57. Id., at 668, 384 N.E.2d at 93 (the court considered the discharge in retaliation for
filing a Workmen's Compensation claim in Leach a violation of public policy found in a
statute).
58. 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (4th Dist. 1977); see notes 37-43 supra and
accompanying text; cf. Palamteer v. Int'l Harvester Co., No. 53780, slip op. at 8 (Ill. April,
1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
59. See notes 49-53 supra and accompanying text. The court in Leach, while recognizing
that the sources of public policy are confined to the Illinois Constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions, 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1024, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (4th Dist. 1977), softened
the traditional Illinois interpretation of public policy by describing it as that which has a
mere "tendency" to be injurious to the public or against the public good. Id., 366 N.E.2d at
1147. The Leach court's analysis of public policy, however, has remained peculiar to that
decision and to the dissenting opinions in cases where wrongful discharge claims have been
denied. See Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 1002, 411 N.E.2d 50, 56 (5th
Dist. 1980) (dissenting opinion); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 54, 406
N.E.2d 595, 599 (3d Dist. 1980) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, No. 53780 (Ill. April, 1981). The
Kelsay decision also did not define public policy broadly. Rather, the court looked solely to
the Workmen's Compensation Act as a source from which to derive a public policy statement. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 180-82, 184-86, 384 N.E.2d 353, 356-57 (1978). By focusing on a statutory source of policy, the Kelsay decision did not compel lower courts to enlarge their perceptions of public policy.
60. 66 Ill. App. 3d at 669, 384 N.E.2d at 95.
61. Id. at 669-70, 384 N.E.2d at 94-95.
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tional Harvester Co.32 The plaintiff, who had been employed by

International Harvester for fifteen years,"8 alleged that his employment was terminated for cooperating in a police investigation of
another employee. The appellate court recognized that a cause of
action for wrongful discharge was formulated in response to the
modern reality that individuals are dependent on each other for
their livelihoods. 65 Dismissal of the complaint, however, was affirmed because the court could locate no Illinois precedent where
an employee had been discharged for participating in a police investigation. 6 The court justified its decision by asserting that Illinois courts are reluctant to expand a tort in the absence of compelling reasons.67 As in Criscione, lack of a public policy violation
permitted the court to apply the terminable at will rule.68
The Palmateerdecision went even farther than Criscione in limiting the sources from which to derive public policy. By looking
only to cases with identical fact situations," the court ignored an
available statutory source of public policy.7 0 As the dissenting

opinion in Palmateer pointed out, the plaintiff was forced to
choose between his job and participating in a police investigation,
thus subverting the general policy advanced by the Illinois Criminal Code.7
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court's
7 Although the court recognized the harshness of the terdecisions.
minable at will rule and the unequal bargaining positions occupied
by employers and employees, it still relied on the existence of "established" and "clearly mandated" public policy in concluding that
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action.$ As in Kelsay,7 the
court claimed that the legislature had created the public policy
allegedly violated.78 The legislatively created public policy in
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 406 N.E.2d 595 (3d Dist. 1980).
Id. at 51, 406 N.E.2d at 596-97.
Id., 406 N.E.2d at 596-97.
Id. at 52, 406 N.E.2d at 597.
Id., 406 N.E.2d at 597-98.
Id., 406 N.E.2d at 598.
Id., 406 N.E.2d at 597-98.
Id.
Id. at 57, 406 N.E.2d at 601.
Id.
Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., No. 53780 (Ill. April, 1981).
Id. slip op. at 2, 4, 7.

74.

74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).

75.

Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., No. 53780, slip op. at 5-6 (Ill. April, 1981).
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Palmateer was found in the Illinois Criminal Codes which the
employee under investigation was alleged to have violated." Thus,
although Palmateerextended Kelsay to a fact situation other than
a discharge for filing a Workmen's Compensation claim, Palmateer
may still be confined to circumstances where a discharge violates
settled public policy.
The predominant message of Criscione and Palmateeris that Illinois courts are hesitant to expand the Kelsay court's recognition
of a tortious cause of action for wrongful discharge. These cases
unnecessarily restrict the sources in which public policy may be
found. 78 Reliance on only settled public policy encourages courts to
depend on precedent rather than to develop new and relevant policy.79 This approach, however, confuses the law governing public

policy with that regarding precedent.80 As former Illinois Supreme
Court Justice Walter V. Schaefer stated, "precedent speaks for the
past; policy for the present and future."8 1 According to Justice
Schaefer, decisions having current social value must reflect a balance of policy and precedent considerations. 2
The conservative stand taken by Illinois courts regarding stare
decisis further inhibits the development of new law. Before firmly
established judicial law will be changed by the courts, it must be
shown to contravene constitutional or statutory principles, or to be
likely to act as a serious detriment to the public interest." Moreover, the courts are reluctant to introduce changes in the law absent legislative support for the modifications. "
Because the terminable at will rule is firmly entrenched in Illinois law, judicial adherence to it is consistent with the courts' loyalty to precedent. In turn, because recent cases involving wrongful
discharge claims apply the same rules with regard to public policy
and stare decisis, it has become extremely difficult to develop the
tort cause of action for wrongfully discharged employees. The restricted applicability of tort law, however, need not leave employ76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1-1 et seq. (1979).
77. No. 53780, slip op. at 6.
78. See notes 54-71 supra.
79. See notes 80-81 infra and accompanying text.
80. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 3, 24 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Schaefer].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196-97, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1968).
84. Id. But see Schaefer, supra note 80, at 3, 24 (stating that the legislature has little
time for keeping the common law current).
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ees unprotected against wrongful discharges. If employment agreements were brought into conformity with general Illinois contract
law, a breach of contract action for wrongful discharge would be
available to employees.
CONTRACT LAW AS A BASIS FOR A WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CAUSE OF

ACTION
Although a contract action usually will not support an award of
punitive damages, 5 there are a number of advantages to proceeding in contract rather than tort. First, a breach of contract claim,
unlike a tort action, would not be predicated on a public policy
violation. The terms of the employment contract, as implied in law
or fact, would be the basis for the cause of action." The plaintiff
would thereby avoid the problems posed by the Illinois courts' reluctance to find policy violations.8 7 Second, the use of contract law
would allow the court to substitute well-settled contract principles
for the outdated precedent regarding the terminable at will rule.
Third, both the employment relationship and the terminable at
will rule are based on contract principles." The rules governing
terminable at will employment agreements, however, are no longer
consistent with the law applied to other contracts.8 ' Modification
of the terminable at will rule through use of general contract theory would promote consistency in Illinois contract law, and force
the courts to modernize the rule. By applying contract principles,
the terminable at will rule could become an effective tool for protecting both an employee's desire for job security and an employer's interest in retaining the necessary discretion for making
sound business decisions.
The use -of contract law in Illinois as a successful basis for. a
85. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 187, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (1978). The potential for punitive damages in a tort action should not be over-emphasized. The Kelsay court
was careful to point out that punitive damages are not favored, and that courts must exercise caution to make sure that punitive damages are not unwisely awarded. Id. at 188, 384
N.E.2d at 360.
86. See notes 132-191 infra and accompanying text.
87. See generally notes 44-84 supra and accompanying text.
88. Board of Educ. v. Indus. Comm'n, 53 Ill. 2d 167, 171-72, 290 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1972);
Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Jockish, 83 Ill. App. 3d 411, 415-16, 403 N.E.2d 1290, 1293-94 (3d Dist.
1980); Comment, Employment at Will, supra note 5, at 240. It should also be noted that
one Illinois court has barred an employee from bringing a wrongful discharge claim on the
basis of tort when the employee was covered by a collective bargaining agreement that allowed the employer to discharge for just cause only. Cook v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 85 Ill.
App. 3d 402, 406, 407 N.E.2d 95, 98 (3d Dist. 1980).
89. See generally notes 14-24 supra and accompanying text.
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wrongful discharge suit necessitates an analysis of general contract

law. Obstacles to the use of contract law as a means of limiting an
employer's power are found in both the law governing the requirements for a valid contract and the rules for construing a contract.
In order to bring a successful suit, an employee would have to be
able to avoid flaws in the form of the contract as well as in the
contract's terms.
Requirements of a Valid Contract
Mutuality of Obligation

In addition to the traditional elements of offer, acceptance, and

consideration, ee some Illinois courts treat mutuality of obligation

as an independent requirement for a valid contract.' 1 The term
mutuality of obligation has been defined in two different ways by
Illinois courts. Determining the correct definition of this concept is
crucial to the use of contract law as a means to limit an employer's
ability to discharge an employee arbitrarily."s
One interpretation defines mutuality of obligation as requiring

that "both parties are bound or neither is bound" to the contract. 93
If mutuality of obligation is not present, the contract is declared
void and unenforceable." Symmetry is the crux of this definition
of mutuality.' 5 Accordingly, terminable at will employment con-

90. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 IIl. 2d 320, 329, 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (1977).
91. See notes 92-99 infra and accompanying text.
92. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 105A (3d ed. 1967); Blades, supra note 5, at 1419-21;
Comment, Employment at Will, supra note 5, at 240.
93. Vogel v. Pekoc, 157 II. 339, 342, 42 N.E. 386, 387 (1895). It is interesting to note that
the employee in Vogel was the defendant. Id. at 340, 42 N.E. at 386. The employment contract restricted the defendant employee's ability to quit by requiring that he first give notice. Id. at 341, 42 N.E. at 386. Because the plaintiff employer was not bound to keep the
defendant in its employ, but the defendant was not free to quit without notice, the contract
was considered void for lack of mutuality. Id. at 342-43, 42 N.E. at 387. See also Meadows v.
Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 347, 348 (7th Cir. 1955); Gardiakos v. Vanguard Communications, Inc., 38 Ill. App. 3d 937, 939, 350 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1st Dist. 1976); Kraftco Corp. v.
Koblus, 1 111. App. 3d 635, 638, 274 N.E.2d 153, 155 (4th Dist. 1971); Hillman v. Hodag
Chemical Corp., 96 Ill. App. 2d 204, 207, 238 N.E.2d 145, 147 (1st Dist. 1968).
94. Meadows v. Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 347, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1955); Vogel v. Pekoc,
157 Ill. 339, 342, 42 N.E. 386, 387 (1895); Schoen v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 I. App. 2d
197, 200, 243 N.E.2d 31, 33 (3d Dist. 1968); Goodman v. Motor Prod. Corp., 9 I1. App. 2d
57, 70-71, 132 N.E.2d 356, 362 (2d Dist. 1956).
95. By implication, see generally cases cited at note 106, infra. See also Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Blades, supra note 5, at
1425-26 (describing mutuality of obligation as merely an appeal to symmetry and hollow
notions).
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tracts are valid because neither party is bound to the agreement."
If an employer's right to terminate at will is hampered, the contract will be void unless the employee's ability to quit is also restricted.' This interpretation of mutuality has rendered unenforceable numerous employment contracts when employees have

sued for wrongful discharge.98
96. See generally Meadows v. Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955); Vogel v.
Pekoc, 157 I11.
339, 42 N.E. 386 (1895); Schoen v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d
197, 243 N.E.2d 31 (3d Dist. 1968).
97. Vogel v. Pekoc, 157 Ill. 339, 343, 42 N.E. 386, 387 (1895); accord, Blades, supra note
5, at 1419. See generally cases cited at notes 102 & 103 infra. Restricting the employee's
ability to quit has been described as unacceptable in the United States, perhaps because of
the national abhorrence to slavery. Blades, supra note 5, at 1425. The employee's right to
choose for whom to work has become too valuable to be circumscribed in order to prevent
abuse of the almost negligible coercive power of the employee's threat to quit his or her job.
The situation of the employer differs drastically. Id. at 1425-26.
98. See, e.g., Meadows v. Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955); Criscione v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 384 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1978); Schoen v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 197, 243 N.E.2d 31 (3d Dist. 1968).
The Vogel mutuality requirement can be avoided by proving that the employment contract was unilateral. The classification of the contract as unilateral becomes important
mainly because of its ensuing allocation of contractual duties. A promisor is the only party
who is bound to the contract. J. CALImARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 1-10 (2d ed. 1977); 1
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 21 (1963). Thus, when the employer is the promisor, the employer
is the only party against whom the contract can be enforced. 1A A. CORIN, CoNrAcTs §
152 (1963). Because the promisor is the only party legally bound to the contract, it is immaterial that the employee, but not the employer, has the ability to arbitrarily terminate the
relationship. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1963).
In a unilateral contract, the employer is bound to his or her offer once the offeree begins
performance. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 49 (1963). The offer is also sometimes considered
irrevocable once the offeree foreseeably changes position in reliance on the offer. Id. The
employee, however, remains free not to complete performance unless acceptance of the offer
implied a promise to fully perform. Id. at § 21; 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 60, at 187 (3d
ed. 1967). Thus, mutuality of obligation requirements are not present when contracts are
unilateral.
The assertion of the existence of a unilateral contract does have its drawbacks. For example, having a unilateral contract may leave the employee with minimal job security. Because
employment contracts have been regarded as a series of unilateral offers, see note 11 supra,
the employer is bound to his or her offer only until the requested performance is completed.
1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 49 (1963). Thus, unless the offer states or implies a specific duration, see notes 132-191 infra and accompanying text, the practical effect of construing the
contract as unilateral is to allow the employer to withdraw the offer at any time, without
incurring liability, by discharging the employee. See notes 12 & 13 supra and accompanying
text. The task for the employee, then, becomes to prove implications in the contract that
the offer was for a definite duration by virtue of the performance requested or the promise
made by the employer. See notes 132-193 infra and accompanying text.

An employee may also be able to avoid the mutuality doctrine by arguing that it is a rule
of construction rather than a substantive requirement. This argument finds some support in
Hillman v. Hodag Chem. Corp., 96 ill. App. 2d 204, 238 N.E.2d 145 (1st Dist. 1968). The
court in Hillman stated that mutuality must be determined as a matter of construction. Id.
at 207, 238 N.E.2d at 147. In turn, the court's focus should be on the language of the con-
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Employment contracts restricting the employer's, but not the
employee's, ability to terminate the employment relationship need
not be held unenforceable for lack of mutuality. Another line of
Illinois cases treats mutuality of obligation as a requirement synonymous with the need for consideration." Equating mutuality

tract to determine whether mutuality exists. Id., 238 N.E.2d at 147. Because rules of contract construction require judicial consideration of the intent of the parties as indicated by
the language of the contract, this approach would free the courts from being forced to automatically declare that a contract binding the employer, but not the employee, is void for
lack of mutuality.
Further support for minimizing the use of the mutuality doctrine is found in Palmateer v.
Int'l Harvester Co., No. 53780 (I1. April, 1981), where the court described the doctrine as
"harsh" and containing "shortcomings" due to its lack of recognition that employers and
employees possess disparate bargaining power. Id. slip op. at 2.
99. Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, 133 N.E.2d
711 (1921); Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 736, 394 N.E.2d 1303 (1st
Dist. 1979); Cox v. Grant, 57 Ill. App. 3d 922, 373 N.E.2d 820 (5th Dist. 1978); Litow v.
Aurora Beacon News, 61 Ill. App. 2d 127, 209 N.E.2d 668 (2d Dist. 1965).
Treating mutuality and consideration as interchangeable terms has been described as better reasoned in both theory and justice than the Vogel approach. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 152 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 105A (3d ed. 1967); Blades, supra note 5, at
1419-20; Comment, Employment At Will, supra note 5, at 219. The symmetry requirement
for mutuality is considered theoretically confusing because of its inconsistency with other
contract law. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 105A (3d ed. 1967). See generally 1A A. CORIN,
CONTRACTS § 152 (1963).
For example, the Illinois Supreme Court in Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co., 301 Ill. 102, 108, 133 N.E.2d 711, 714 (1921), stated that if mutuality were
held to be a required element in every contract, to the extent that both contracting parties
could sue on it, there could be no such thing as a valid unilateral contract. Because a promisor is the only party in an executory unilateral contract who can be legally bound to the
agreement, J. CALIMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 1-10 (2d ed. 1977); 1 A. CoRsIN, CONTRACTS § 21 (1963), mutual obligation is lacking. 1A A. CORSIN, CoNTRACTs § 152 (1963); 1 S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 105A (3d ed. 1967). The Armstrong court recognized that unilateral contracts possess unquestionable validity in Illinois, however, and thus decided that
consideration, not mutuality, was the necessary element for creating a binding contract. 301
Ill. 102, 108, 133 N.E.2d 711, 714 (1921).
Another area of contract law inconsistent with the Vogel definition of mutuality involves
contracts for permanent employment. In Illinois, before a permanent employment contract
is declared enforceable against the employer, the employee must show that he or she supplied consideration in addition to rendering services. Heuvelman v. Triplett Elec. Instrument Co., 23 Ill. App. 2d 231, 236, 161 N.E.2d 875, 877 (1st Dist. 1959); Goodman v. Motor
Prod. Corp., 9 Ill. App. 2d 57, 77, 132 N.E.2d 356, 365-66 (2d Dist. 1956). The additional
consideration, though, need not restrict the employee's ability to quit his or her job. Molitor
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 325 Ill. App. 124, 59 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist. 1945); Jones v.
Stoneware Pipe Co., 277 Ill. App. 18 (4th Dist. 1934) (an employee's release of claim for
damages was sufficient consideration to support a contract for permanent employment). Because the employer's right to terminate the employment relationship is infringed upon by
the contract terms promising permanency, there exists no mutuality in the sense that the
contract is equally enforceable by the parties.
But see Molitor v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 325 Ill. App. 124, 59 N.E.2d 695 (1st Dist.
1945), where the court stated that when the intention of the parties clearly was to enter a
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with consideration would avoid the problems encountered when an
employer and employee are bound in different ways to the employment relationship.0 0
Adequacy of Consideration
Consideration is required to prevent the enforcement of gratuitous promises.10 1 Generally, Illinois courts will not question the
sufficiency of consideration supporting a contract unless the consideration is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the
court. 10 2 In addition, Illinois law does not require the consideration

to be reciprocal. 03 Thus, even when a party makes only one promise in exchange for numerous promises by the other party, the consideration is valid.' 0 4 When applied to the terminable at will employment contract, the law of consideration, unlike the mutuality
doctrine, would permit an employee's mere performance of services 0

5

to constitute adequate consideration for an employer's

permanent employment contract, the contract was binding even though the employee's only
consideration was his promise to render services. Id. at 135, 159 N.E.2d at 699. Molitor was
distinguished by the Goodman court on its facts. In Goodman, the court stated that the
plaintiff in Molitor had given additional consideration because he had quit a former job and
moved to Chicago, and the employer knew that these sacrifices were made in consideration
for the promise of permanent employment. Goodman v. Motor Prod. Corp., 9 Ill. App. 2d
57, 77, 132 N.E.2d 356, 366 (2d Dist. 1956).
100. See notes 93-98 supra and accompanying text.
101. Wickstrom v. Vern E. Alden Co., 99 Ill. App. 2d 254, 261, 240 N.E.2d 401, 405 (1st
Dist. 1968). Consideration is defined in Illinois as an act or promise which is of benefit to
one party or a disadvantage to the other party. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Inl.
2d 320, 330, 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (1977). Consideration is only adequate if it legally obligates
both parties and is the detriment or benefit for which the parties bargained. See, e.g., Bank
of Marion v. Fritz, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 120, 123-24, 311 N.E.2d 138, 140 (1974); Schoen v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 Il. App. 2d 197, 200, 243 N.E.2d 31, 33 (3d Dist. 1968). A contract
without adequate consideration is unenforceable. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69
Ill. 2d 320, 329, 371 N.E.2d 634, 639 (1977); Bank of Marion v. Fritz, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 120, 123,
311 N.E.2d 138, 139 (1974).
102. Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 736, 743, 394 N.E.2d 1303, 1308
(1st Dist. 1979). See also Sta-Ru Corp. v. Mahin, 64 II. 2d 330, 356 N.E.2d 67 (1976); Cox v.
Grant, 57 Ill. App. 3d 922, 373 N.E.2d 820 (5th Dist. 1978); Wickstrom v. Vern E. Alden Co.,
99 111.App. 2d 254, 240 N.E.2d 401 (1st Dist. 1968).
103. Cox v. Grant, 57 Ill. App. 3d 922, 925, 373 N.E.2d 820, 823 (5th Dist. 1978)(where
the tenant's promise to pay rent was sufficient consideration even though the landlord had
agreed to allow the tenant to break the lease, but did not himself have the freedom to evict
the tenant arbitrarily); Aristocrat Window Co. v. Randell, 56 Ill. App. 2d 415, 206 N.E.2d
545 (1st Dist. 1965) (where the employer's promise to pay wages was sufficient consideration
for the employee's promise to both work and give notice, even though the employer could
discharge the employee for good cause without notice).
104. See generally cases cited at note 103 supra.
105. Performance of services would be the consideration an employee at will would need
to provide in order to avoid giving an illusory promise. An illusory promise is one where the
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promises of both job security and compensation for those services.10 The ability under consideration principles to limit the employer's freedom to discharge, without restricting the employee's
right to quit, is the advantage to adopting this analysis.
Instead of following the flexible consideration requirements applied to other contracts, Illinois courts have used rigid rules to test
the adequacy of consideration in terminable at will employment
contracts.1 0 7 Although strict rules may be justified for executory
terminable at will contracts, where by definition neither party is
bound to honor the terms of the agreement,10 8 application of rigid
rules is unfounded once the employee has begun performance of
the terms of the contract.1 09 The employee's performance should
be regarded as a sufficient detriment to the employee, or benefit to
the employer, 110 to constitute binding consideration."' In turn, because the law already binds the employer to his or her promise to
compensate the employee once the employee has rendered services,
both parties would be bound to the contract."' The risk of enforc1
ing a gratuitous promise would thereby be eliminated. 3
The harshness of the consideration rules governing terminable at
will employment contracts is best illustrated by cases where an
employer has promised permanent employment' 4 and payment of
wages in return for an employee's services. The general rule in

promisor is free not to honor the commitment. Dasenbrock v. Interstate Restaurant Corp., 7
Ill. App. 3d 295, 302, 287 N.E.2d 151, 156 (5th Dist. 1972). Because a terminable at will
employment contract by definition allows the parties to abandon their contractual relationship at any time, an employee's mere promise to work could be considered illusory. IA A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1963); see text accompanying notes 110-113 supra. See also Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 736, 394 N.E.2d 1303 (1st Dist. 1979); Litow
v. Aurora Beacon News, 61 111. App. 2d 127, 209 N.E.2d 668 (2d Dist. 1965).
106. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 125 (1963).
107. See notes 108-131 infra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 3 & 105 supra.
109. See notes 110-113 infra and accompanying text.
110. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
111. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1963).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. "Permanent" does not mean eternal. Rather, a "permanent" employment contract
is commonly interpreted as an agreement for definite work at a stated salary for a specific
work period. 1 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 96 (1963). "Permanent" has also been described as
binding the parties for as long as an employee can work and an employer is engaged in
business. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 39 (3d ed. 1967). See also Molitor v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 325 Ill. App. 24 133, 59 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1st Dist. 1945)(where the court stated
that it would be unreasonable to hold that the employer had bound himself for as long as
both parties lived, regardless of business conditions or the employee's performance).
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these situations is that before a permanent employment contract is
enforceable, the employee must provide consideration in addition
to the services for which compensation is to be paid. 115 If this additional or special consideration is lacking, the contract is deemed
terminable at will,"" thereby allowing the employer to disregard
his or her promise of a permanent employment relationship. ' The
severity of the rule is enhanced by the reluctance of Illinois courts
to find the additional consideration necessary to support the employer's promise of job security. 8
The application of particularly rigid consideration principles to
terminable at will employment contracts lacks a strong legal basis.
This deficiency is seen clearly in the case of Cox v. Grant,1' 9 which
involved a terminable at will lease.12 Although the tenant reserved
the right to terminate the relationship at any time, the landlord
was not free to break the lease arbitrarily. 2 ' Nonetheless, the court

115. Heuvelman v. Triplett Elec. Instrument Co., 23 Ill. App. 2d 231, 236, 161 N.E.2d
875, 877 (1st Dist. 1959); Goodman v. Motor Prod. Corp., 9 IlM.App. 2d 57, 77, 132 N.E.2d
356, 365-66 (2d Dist. 1956); see note 99 supra.
116. Cf. Meadows v. Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 1955). See also Davis
v. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 208 Il. 375, 70 N.E. 359 (1904).
117. See generally cases cited at note 3 supra.
1.18. See, e.g., Meadows v. Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955)(holding that
the employee who gave up former employment and moved from Wisconsin to Chicago, with
the understanding that his employment was to be permanent, had not provided sufficient
additional consideration to bind the employer to a permanent contract); Heuvelman v.
Triplett Elec. Instrument Co., 23 Ill. App. 2d 231, 161 N.E.2d 875 (1st Dist. 1959) (the
employee's foregoing another employment opportunity was not held to bind the employer to
a contract of permanent employment). Goodman v. Motor Prod. Corp., 9 Ill. App. 2d 57, 132
N.E.2d 356 (2d Dist. 1956) (a distributor's devotion of full time and attention to selling
supplier's products was deemed inadequate consideration for a permanent contract). See
also 1 A. CORBIN, ComNRAcTs § 96 (1963) (asserting that when an employee has greatly
changed his or her position, the court should fill in gaps of indefinite terms of employment
contract by liberally interpreting contract terms and by making inferences from performances already rendered).
The above cases deal with reliance as a possible form of consideration. Treating reliance
as consideration, however, seems to confuse the law regarding promissory estoppel and that
pertaining to consideration. This confusion apparently stems from the Illinois courts' different interpretations of promissory estoppel. One interpretation treats promissory estoppel as
a species of consideration. See, e.g., Wickstrom v. Vern E. Alden Co., 99 Ill. App. 2d 254,
263, 240 N.E.2d 401, 406 (1st Dist. 1968). The other interpretation defines promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration when ordinary consideration requirements are not met.
See, e.g., Bank of Marion v. Fritz Co., 57 Ill. 2d 120, 124, 311 N.E.2d 138, 140 (1974); Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 736, 748, 394 N.E.2d 1303, 1311 (1st Dist.
1979).
119. 57 Ill. App. 3d 922, 373 N.E.2d 820 (5th Dist. 1978).
120. Id. at 923, 373 N.E.2d at 821.
121. Id. at 924, 373 N.E.2d at 821.
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upheld the contract."'2 First, the court relied on the general rule
that consideration should not be scrutinized to determine its adequacy.128 Second, the court recognized that symmetry in consideration is unnecessary." 4 Consequently, even though only the tenant
could terminate
the lease without incurring liability, the contract
25
valid.1
was
Cox demonstrates that general contract law is applicable to terminable at will agreements."12 The continued application of strict
rules to terminable at will employment contracts suggests that the
nature of the employment relationship justifies the imposition of
unusually harsh rules. Such a conclusion, however, ignores the in-7
herently unequal positions of the employer and the employee. 1
Because the employer possesses greater bargaining leverage,128 it

makes little sense to protect the employer by presuming that, despite the language of his or her promise, the employer intended the
relationship to be terminable at will. This inequity becomes even
more apparent when the law presumes that an employee has
knowledge that, absent additional consideration, an9 employer's
promise of permanent employment is unenforceable.1"
Dissimilar treatment of employment contracts also overlooks the
essentially contractual nature of the employer-employee relationship." 0 In the interests of consistency, the law of consideration
which governs other types of contracts should be applied to terminable at will employment contracts. If consistency were obtained,
the court would be free to enforce the intentions and expectations
122. Id. at 926, 373 N.E.2d at 823.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 925, 373 N.E.2d at 823.
125. Id. at 926, 373 N.E.2d at 823.
126. Requiring separate consideration before a contract for permanent employment is
enforceable has been described as artificial because no obvious reasons exist for breaking the
contract into two separate parts, one to employ and one to employ permanently. Blades,
supra note 5, at 1419-20; Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 7, at 351 n.113.
The artificiality of separate consideration is further evidenced by the Illinois approach to
incorporating terms of personnel policies into employment contracts. In such situations, additional consideration is unnecessary to modify the terms of the employment contract to
include provisions in personnel manuals, even when those provisions limit the employer's
ability to discharge employees. See notes 147-153 infra and accompanying text.
127. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
128. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
129. Cummings v. Chicago, Aurora and Elgin Ry., 348 Ill. App. 537, 541, 109 N.E.2d 378,
380 (1st Dist. 1952), citing Davis v. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 208 Ill. 375, 70 N.E. 359 (1904).
130. Board of Educ. v. Indus. Comm'n, 53 Ill. 2d 167, 171-72, 290 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1972);
Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Jockish, 83 Ill. App. 3d 411, 415-16, 403 N.E.2d 1290, 1293 (3d Dist.
1980).
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of the parties 1 ' as evidenced by the terms of the contract for
which they originally bargained.
Construction of Indefinite Terms
Even if an agreement contains all of the necessary components
of a valid contract, it may be unenforceable if its terms are so indefinite that a court is unable to interpret them. 182 Because a terminable at will contract contains no definite term of duration, a
court's ability to remedy the uncertainty becomes critical.
The goal of all judicial construction of contracts is to enforce the
intent of the parties. 13 3 Intent is to be derived initially from the

language of the contract.'3 When contract provisions are absent or
indefinite, however, a court must place itself in the position of the
parties 3 5 and consider the surrounding circumstances to determine
the parties' intentions. Preference is given to a construction of the
contract which will establish a binding relationship between the
parties.1 3 6

Despite the flexible analysis used to construe most contracts,
courts frequently rely on mechanical rules when interpreting employment contracts.1 3 7 When employment contracts do not contain
definite terms of duration,'" courts presume that the parties intended their relationship to be terminable at will.'3 9 Although the
131. See notes 133-136 infra and accompanying text.
132. Kraftco Corp. v. Koblus, 1 Ill. App. 3d 635, 637, 274 N.E.2d 153, 155 (4th Dist.
1971); Goodman v. Motor Prod. Corp., 9 Il1. App. 2d 57, 73, 132 N.E.2d 356, 363-64 (2d Dist.
1956).
133. Schek v. CTA, 42 II. 2d 362, 364, 247 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1969); Schiro v. W. E. Gould
& Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 542-43, 165 N.E.2d 286, 289 (1960); In re Estate of Klinker, 80 Ill. App.
3d 28, 30, 399 N.E.2d 299, 301 (5th Dist. 1979); Dasenbrock v. Interstate Restaurant Corp., 7
Ill. App. 3d 295, 299, 287 N.E.2d 151, 153 (5th Dist. 1972).
134. Schek v. CTA, 42 Ill. 2d 362, 364, 247 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1969); St. Joseph Data Serv.,
Inc., v. Thomas Jefferson Life Ins. Co. of America, 73 Ill. App. 3d 935, 940, 393 N.E.2d 611,
617 (4th Dist. 1979).
135. In re Estate of Klinker, 80 Ill. App. 3d 28, 30-31, 399 N.E.2d 299, 301 (5th Dist.
1979); Dasenbrock v. Interstate Restaurant Corp., 7 Ill. App. 3d 293, 295, 287 N.E.2d 151,
153-54 (5th Dist. 1972).
136. Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 542-43, 165 N.E.2d 286, 289 (1960).
137. See notes 138-168 infra and accompanying text.
138. An employment contract stating the time basis on which compensation is to be
calculated is sufficiently indefinite to be considered terminable at will. Palmateer v. Intl
Harvester Co., 85 II. App. 3d 50, 52, 406 N.E.2d 595, 597 (3d Dist. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 53780 (Ill. April, 1981); Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 369, 37374, 161 N.E.2d 355, 357 (1st Dist. 1959). But see Grauer v. Valve & Primer Corp., 47 I.
App. 3d 152, 361 N.E.2d 863 (2d Dist. 1977).
139. See generally cases cited at notes 2 & 3 supra.
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ultimate focus should be on intent, the consequence of this presumption is that courts ignore what the- parties actually
contemplated. 1 0
Lack of attention to the intent of the parties is particularly
harmful in employment contracts, which are typically short, informal and nonspecific.141 Although parties to an employment contract may intend to be bound, they may have no specific duration
in mind for the employment relationship.14 s The absence of specificity in the contract, however, has the effect of invoking the terminable at will rule. The real intent of the parties is lost in the
4

process.'1

"Outside of terminable at will contracts, agreements
with indefinite provisions are usually cured by implying terms to clarify the
contract.144 Implication of terms in a terminable at will contract
could curb an employer's power to terminate the contract arbitrarily. Because this approach is used with other types of indefinite
contracts, it has a solid legal foundation. 4 5 Moreover, the use of
implied terms would not restrict the exercise of an employer's
sound business judgment. Implication could be used by both parties to the contract, thereby protecting the employer as well as the
employee.
Implied-in-Fact Terms
There are a number of sources from which to imply terms of
employment contracts. The most common sources are personnel
policies, compensation rates, and customs of trade.
1. Personnel Policies
Whether policy statements in personnel manuals may be construed as implied terms of employment agreements has been hotly
140. Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1818; Examples in Illinois of blind application of the terminable at will rule include Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist. v. Jones, 51 Ill. App. 3d 182, 367 N.E.2d 111 (3d Dist. 1977); Roemer v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
25 Ill. App. 3d 606, 323 N.E.2d 582 (1st Dist. 1975); Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22 Ill.
App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d 355 (1st Dist. 1959).
141. 3A A. CoRmN, CoNTRAcTs § 684 (1963).
142. Id.
143. See note 140 supra.
144. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 334, 371 N.E.2d 634, 641 (1977);
Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 544, 165 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1960); Litow v. Aurora
Beacon News, 61 Ill. App. 2d 127, 133, 209 N.E.2d 668, 671 (2d Dist. 1965).
145. See generally cases cited at note 144 supra.
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debated. 146 Illinois has taken a hybrid approach by incorporating
in an employment contract those personnel manual provisions
which were introduced by the employer subsequent to entering
into the contract. 14 The subsequent introduction of policy terms
acts as a modification ofthe original agreement.14 8 If an employee
continues to work after the personnel policy becomes effective, the
employee is presumed to have consented to the modification. 49 On
the other hand, when the policy was adopted prior to the formation of an employment contract, the terms are not incorporated.'"
An employee who accepts work from an employer who has already
promulgated a personnel policy is considered not to have bargained for that policy. Thus, the policy is not incorporated into the
terms of the employment contract.''
This distinction is artificial. The Illinois decisions do not satisfactorily explain why continuing to work, as opposed to commencing work, constitutes the bargaining and the consideration6 M sufficient to render policy statements part of the contract terms.'"

146. See, e.g., Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (the
court assumed that a policy handbook constituted part of the employment contract terms);
McQueeney v. Glenn, 400 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. App. 1980) (the court refused to construe personnel policy as part of the contract because restricting the employer's, but not the employee's, ability to terminate the employment relationship destroyed mutuality of obligation); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (the
court held that the employer should be bound by the act of implementing personnel policy);
Chin v. AT&T, 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S. 737 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (the court reasoned that an
employment manual cannot comprise contract terms because policy provisions are not sufficiently definite and inclusive to create a valid contract).
147. Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d
574 (5th Dist. 1974).
148. Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1059, 322
N.E.2d 574, 576 (5th Dist. 1974).
149. Id.
150. Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1st Dist.
1979).
151. Id. at 121-22, 397 N.E.2d at 443-46.
152. Note that other Illinois cases have held that consideration besides rendering services must be furnished before an employer's ability to discharge the employee may be restricted. See generally cases cited at notes 99, 114-118 supra and accompanying text.
153. An explanation for the different holdings in Carter and Sargent could be that the
court in Sargent wanted to limit the application of Carter. The soundness of the Sargent
approach to limiting Carter is questionable. If an introduction of personnel policy subsequent to the creation of an employment contract is binding as a modification of the original
agreement's terms, a change in a pre-existing policy should also be binding on the employer.
Thus, if an employee entered an employment relationship with an employer who already
possessed a stated policy, a change in the policy would bind the employer. If a mere change
in policy were sufficient to bind the employer, Sargent has accomplished little in its limitation of Carter.
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Moreover, the judiciary's approach ignores the reasonable expectations of the parties. When an employer formulates personnel policy, the logical inference is that he or she is seeking to establish
guidelines for employee performance. In addition, when the policy
restrains the employer's ability to discharge employees, the employer presumably anticipates a beneficial result, such as improved
employee attitudes or work performance. Formulation of personnel
policy also foreseeably induces employee reliance on that policy. In
fact, if this were not the result, the employer's purpose for creating
the policy would seemingly be defeated.
These considerations recently led the Supreme Court of Michigan to hold that an employer's policy statement requiring discharges to be made only for good cause constituted a term of the
employment contract. 1 " The court, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield,'" found that the employee's reasonable reliance on
the policy was an intended and natural consequence of the creation
of the policy.'" In particular, the court described the policy statements as "instinct with obligation"" 7 and thus binding on the employer. 5 8 Therefore, the employer was estopped from maintaining
that the policy statements were illusory and unenforceable.'"
The Toussaint court's approach is a realistic assessment of the
expectations of an employer and employee who are operating according to guidelines established by the employer. By holding the
employer responsible for the natural consequences of formulating
policy, and by requiring the employee's reliance on that policy to
be reasonable, the court struck an appropriate balance between the

154. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892-93.
157. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 621, 292 N.W.2d at 895. The Toussaint decision bound the employer although the employment contract did not contain an express provision regarding the duration of the employment relationship. Id. at 596-97, 292 N.W.2d at 883-84. The terminable at
will rule, however, was interpreted by the court to be a mere rule of construction, not substantive law. Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885. As such, the court felt justified in adhering to
the general rule of contract construction that agreements are to be interpreted in accordance with the parties' intentions. Id. Development of personnel policy, reasoned the court,
was adequate evidence that the employer did not intend the employment relationship to be
terminable at will. Id. at 614, 292 N.W.2d at 892. In turn, acceptance of the job offer and
reliance on the personnel policy was a manifestation by the employee of assent to the provisions in the policy. Id. The result was a valid contract in which the policies of the employer
were implied terms.
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parties. 6 0
Although the Toussaint approach has not been applied in Illinois to employment contracts, it does find support in Illinois law.
First, at least one Illinois court has acknowledged that an agreement may be "instinct with obligation," 1 1 notwithstanding a lack
of express commitment in the language of the contract. ' Applying
this rule to an employment contract could bind the employer to
policy statements, even though the employer did not expressly
agree to follow such policy.
Second, the Illinois Supreme Court has already used policy
statements as a source from which to imply contract terms. In
6 3 the court held that an exSteinberg v. Chicago Medical School,"
planation in a school catalogue regarding procedures used for making admissions decisions was binding on the institution.'" The applicant's return of the application with the required processing fee
acted as an offer to apply.' When the school accepted the application, a binding contract was formed, and its terms were those
stated in the school catalogue."'6 The court also reasoned that the
information in the catalogue had induced the plaintiff to apply to
that school.16 7 Because this reliance was both foreseeable and justified, the school was bound by its representations.1 8
The rationale of Steinberg should also govern situations where
an employee enters into an agreement with an employer who formulated personnel policy before the employee was hired. An employee's foreseeable and justifiable reliance on policy statements
by the employer should bind the employer. Personnel policy could
thereby be incorporated into the contract terms. Even when these
policy terms would limit an employer's ability to discharge employees, inclusion of the policy into the employment contract should
160. The court also stated that if an employer does not want to be bound interminably
to the personnel policy, the employer could notify employees that the policy was subject to
unilateral change. This would destroy any reasonable expectations that employees could
have regarding the continuation of the policy. Employees would, however, still be entitled to
expect that whatever policy was in force would be applied uniformly. Id. at 619, 292 N.W.2d
at 894-95.
161. Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 736, 745, 394 N.E.2d 1303, 1309
(1st Dist. 1979).
162. Id. at 744, 394 N.E.2d at 1308-09.
163. 69 Ill. 2d 320, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977).
164. Id. at 330-32, 371 N.E.2d at 639.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 333, 371 N.E.2d at 641.
168. Id. at 333-34, 371 N.E.2d at 641.
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not be viewed as an unwarranted detriment to the employer.
Rather, incorporation should be considered an enforcement of the
intentions of the parties.
2.

Compensation Rates

Using compensation rates as implied terms of duration has been
suggested as a way of avoiding application of the terminable at will
rule. 169 This approach presumes that the parties to an employment
agreement intend their contractual relationship to last for at least
as long as the agreed upon compensation term.7 0 Such an interpretation of compensation terms would transform an otherwise terminable at will employment contract into an agreement possessing
a definite duration,'
thereby limiting the employer's ability to
discharge the employee arbitrarily.
In Grauerv. Valve & Primer Corp.,7 2 the Illinois appellate court
for the Second District adopted this approach to justify its deviation from the terminable at will rule. The court reasoned that an
employment contract that provided for an annual salary and review indicated an intent by the parties to enter into a relationship
with a definite duration. 7 3 The court rejected the general rule that
employment contracts are terminable at will even if they contain
provisions specifying compensation periods. 1 74 The drawback to
169. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 39 (3d ed. 1967).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 47 Ill. App. 3d 152, 361 N.E.2d 863 (2d Dist. 1977).
173. Id. at 155, 361 N.E.2d at 865.
174. Id. Although the court did not expressly reject the general rule that compensation
rate stipulations do not constitute definite terms, the evidence on which the court relied to
justify its decision was sufficiently weak, when compared to cases where the general rule has
been applied, to indicate a departure by the court from the terminable at will rule. See, e.g.,
Buian v. J. L. Jacobs and Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1971); Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22
Ill. App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d 355 (1st Dist. 1959).
In addition to pay periods, by-laws can supply an otherwise indefinite contract with a
specific term of duration. Stevenson v. ITT Harper, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d 568, 366 N.E.2d 561
(lst Dist. 1977).
A reasonable notice requirement may also be a proper term to imply in the employment
contract. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 39 (3d ed. 1967). This view has found support in one
Illinois case dealing with a terminable at will municipal services contract. In Cabak v. City
of St. Charles, 61 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63, 377 N.E.2d 548, 552 (2d Dist. 1978), the court stated
that the proper method of terminating an executory service contract was to give notice.
Requiring notice before terminating an employment contract was also raised in Kraftco
Corp. v. Koblus, 1 Ill. App. 3d 635, 640, 274 N.E.2d 153, 156-57 (4th Dist. 1971), where the
court recognized that a strong argument could be made that reasonable notice is a prerequisite to terminating an at will relationship. The court, however, then noted that prior terminable at will employment contract cases had not required notice. Id.
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the Grauer approach is that employees under contracts providing
for compensation to be calculated on less than an annual basis
would be left with little job security. Thus, the Grauer analysis
would be beneficial only to those employees whose compensation
was calculated on the basis of a substantial period of time.
3.

Custom of Trade or the Common Law of the Job

Another way to supply the agreement with a definite term of duration is to consider the nature of the particular job or industry
involved. 17 5 By emphasizing the particular job covered by the contract, a court could provide a term of duration consistent with the
customs of the industry. This would not compel courts to undertake a mode of analysis with which they are unfamiliar. Courts are
often required to decide customs of trade when construing collec1
tive bargaining agreements'" or contracts for the sale of goods. 7
Consequently, it would not be difficult for courts to apply a similar
analysis to employment relationships not covered by collective bargaining agreements.
Implied-in-Law Term of Good Faith
The ability of courts to impose contractual obligations by operation of law provides an important alternative to extracting contract
terms from the conduct of the parties. The advantage of impliedin-law terms is their lack of dependence on the actions or expressions of the contracting parties.17 8 Therefore, regardless of the existence of personnel policies, annually based compensation terms, or
strong trade customs, an employee could obtain damages for being
wrongfully discharged.
In Illinois, all contracts are construed as requiring the parties to
175. Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 7, at 356. In Illinois, this approach
would be consistent with the rule of contract construction that requires a court to place
itself in the position of the parties, to ascertain their reasonable expectations. See note 135
supra.
176. United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Note,
Implied Contract Rights, supra note 7, at 360. In fact, it is recognized in Illinois that a
collective bargaining agreement, because of both the complexity of matters it governs and
the need to have a comprehensible document, must be written in indefinite terms. Cook v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 II. App. 3d 402, 405, 407 N.E.2d 95, 98 (3d Dist. 1980). When a
dispute arises, the "common law of the industry" is relied upon by the courts to clarify the
vague terms in the agreement. Id. (by implication, citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. 574 (1960)).
177. Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1833.
178. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 335, 371 N.E.2d 634, 641 (1977);
J. CALIMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 1-12, at 19 (2d ed. 1977).
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deal fairly and to act in good faith.17 9 This rule of construction
possesses enormous potential for limiting an employer's power to
make arbitrary discharges. 180 In the first place, the good faith requirement is applied uniformly to all contracts, including employment contracts."8 ' The employee suing for breach of an employment contract would thereby avoid the discriminatory treatment
frequently given employment contract cases.' 82 Moreover, the good
faith requirement could protect an employee from retaliatory discharge, without restricting an employer's ability to exercise sound
business judgment.
To make the good faith requirement a feasible solution to employer abuse of termination rights, a practical definition of good
faith must be formulated. The good faith definition should be responsive to the competing interests of the employer and the employee. In order to balance these interests, the definition of good
faith should look to the conduct of both parties in performing their
contract duties.
Attention to sound business judgment would focus on the conduct of the employer. If an employee were discharged for sound
business reasons, the good faith standard implied in the employment contract would not be breached. This would allow the employer to maintain a high degree of discretion in making business
decisions and personnel determinations. The employer's personnel
decisions would be protected further by the general reluctance of
the courts to scrutinize business decisions. ss
In order to protect the employee, on the other hand, consideration would also have to be given to his or her behavior. Guidelines
for unacceptable employee conduct can be found in the law regard-

179. Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank, 15 Ill. 2d 272, 286, 154 N.E.2d 683, 690
(1958); Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 736, 744, 394 N.E.2d 1303, 1309
(1st Dist. 1979); Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 668, 384 N.E.2d 91,
94 (1st Dist. 1978); Stevenson v. ITT Harper, Inc., 51 Il. App. 3d 568, 573, 366 N.E.2d 561,
567 (1st Dist. 1977); Dasenbrock v. Interstate Restaurant Corp., 7 Ill. App. 3d 295, 300, 287
N.E.2d 151, 154 (5th Dist. 1972).
180. See generally Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1836-44.
181. See, e.g., Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 668, 384 N.E.2d 91,
94 (1st Dist. 1978); Stevenson v. ITT Harper, Inc., 51 II. App. 3d 568, 573, 366 N.E.2d 561,
567 (1st Dist. 1977).
182. See notes 107 & 135 supra.
183. Hall v. Woods, 325 Il. 114, 137-38, 156 N.E. 258, 267 (1927); Wheeler v. Pullman
Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 208, 32 N.E. 420, 423 (1892); Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 66 11. App. 3d 665, 669, 384 N.E.2d 91, 95 (lst Dist. 1978); Ross v. 311 North Cent. Ave.
Bldg. Corp., 130 Ill. App. 2d 336, 349, 264 N.E.2d 406, 413 (1st Dist. 1970); Galler v. Galler,
95 Ill. App. 2d 340, 344, 238 N.E.2d 274, 277 (1st Dist. 1968).
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ing terminations made for good cause.'" Typical incidents giving
an employer good -cause to discharge include employee inefficiency,
dishonesty, and failure to perform any or part of the job duties. 85
Good cause has always been an acceptable reason for an employer to discharge an employee. 18" Even when a contract binds an
employer to an employment relationship for a definite duration,
the employer is free to discharge the employee at any time if good
1 7
cause exists. 0
Thus, by including good cause and sound business judgment in
the definition of good faith, courts would not be confronted with
unfamiliar concepts. This proposed definition of good faith would
allow the employer to discharge an employee performing satisfactorily, if business conditions required such a termination. If an employer disguised an arbitrary termination as an exercise of sound
business judgment, however, courts would be required to examine
more closely the employer's reasons for the termination.
Existing rules of contract construction would protect an employer from spurious claims by disgruntled employees. When reviewing contract performance, Illinois courts favor an interpretation that does not constitute bad faith.'" In the employment
contract situation, an employer who had two reasons for discharging an employee, one based on good cause and the other on bad
faith, would remain free to discharge for good cause." Thus, despite the coexistence of good and bad faith reasons, the discharge
would not be considered a breach of the employment contract. 1 "0
The good faith requirement would comport with the reasonable
expectations of the parties to an employment agreement. A dis-

184. Good cause has generally been defined as a failure by the employee to perform
duties in the scope of employment with the prudence that would ordinarily be used by a
reasonable employee in like circumstances. Comment, Employment At Will, supra note 5,
at 229.
185. Id. at 229-30.
186. H. Vincent Allen & Assoc., Inc. v. Weis, 63 Ill. App. 3d 285, 294-95, 379 N.E.2d 765,
772 (1st Dist. 1978).
187. Familiarity with good cause has been increased by the frequency with which collective bargaining agreements require employers to discharge employees for good cause only.
Comment, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 5, at 1816. In addition, one Illinois
court has already discussed wrongful discharge as a violation of a collective bargaining
agreement term requiring discharges to be only for just cause. Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 85 11. App. 3d 402, 405, 407 N.E.2d 95, 98- (3d Dist. 1980).
188. Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 665, 669, 384 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1st
Dist. 1978).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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charge would have to be made for good cause or pursuant to sound
business goals. The only activity by the employer that would constitute a breach of an employment contract, then, would be a termination for an illegitimate business objective or as retaliation
against an employee. The employee should be able to rely on continued employment for as long as he or she renders adequate services, and the employer is able to pay wages. In turn, the employer
has a right to expect competent performance by the employee.' 9'
CONCLUSION

The potential is great for using contract principles to prevent
wrongful discharges. Technically, Illinois law imposes no insurmountable obstacles to modifying the terminable at will rule. The
success of modification rests with the willingness of Illinois courts
to adapt the terminable at will rule to current social and economic
needs. The ability to effect change by using existing law is the major advantage of predicating a wrongful discharge action on contract theory. If contract law were adopted as a basis for tempering
the terminable at will rule, the impediments present when tort law
constitutes the basis for wrongful discharge would be avoided.
Moreover, contract law would protect the expectations of employers as well as employees. These changes in the terminable at will
rule would result in a far more equitable and realistic assessment
of employment relationships.
ELIZABETH VRANICAR TANIS

191.

See notes 184-187 supra.

